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In a 2005 press release by the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”), Chief Prosecutor Carla Del Ponte stated
“[t]he debate on war crimes in the former Yugoslavia is not subsiding. It 
is present in the daily life and media, and always politicised . . . I am 
much more concerned about the victims of war crimes and their families,
and I appeal to you to make the victim aspect of any legal process a
priority.”1 Despite this stated dedication to war crimes victims and their 
families, the ICTY’s Trial Chamber (“Chamber”) recently acquitted two 
state security officials who organized and executed many crimes in Croatia,
and Bosnia-Herzegovina.2 
The Chamber affirmed and detailed the crimes, named the victims and 
the perpetrators, and specified the connections between the accused and
the perpetrators.3 Then, however, it declined to convict Jovica Stanišic
and Franko Simatović, on the grounds that the evidence did not show that 
their support to criminals was “specifically directed towards the commission 
of the crimes[.]”4 
The Chamber’s requirement that war criminals “specifically direct[] 
the commission of a crime” is an extremely narrow legal standard that 
threatens both the future of the ICTY as well as future ad hoc tribunals. 
With major war criminals indicted and awaiting trial, this decision threatens
the ICTY’s legacy among international tribunals and brings into question
the necessity of future ad hoc tribunals. 
II. RESURGENCE OF THE SERBIAN EMPIRE UNDER SLOBODAN 





Dramatic political and social change swept across Eastern Europe and 
the Soviet Union in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Longtime Yugoslav 
1. Press Release, Office of the Prosecutor, Address of the Prosecutor at the
Inauguration of the War Crimes Chamber of the Court of BH, U.N. Press Release CDP/
P.I.S./944 (Mar. 9, 2005), available at http://www.icty.org/sid/8633/en. 
2. See Int’l Crim. Trib. For the Former Yugoslavia, Case Information Sheet:
Stanišic and Simatović, http://icty.org/x/cases/stanisic_simatovic/cis/en/cis_stanisic_simatovic_ 
en.pdf.
3. See Judgement Summary for Jovica Stanišić and Franko Simatović, Trial 
Chamber, Int’l Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (May 30, 2013), available at http://icty. 
org/x/cases/stanisic_simatovic/tjug/en/130530_summary.pdf [hereinafter Judgment Summary];
see generally Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Simatović, Case No. IT-03-69, Judgement Volume II
of II, (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia May 30, 2013), http://www.icty.
org/x/cases/stanisic_simatovic/tjug/en/130530_judgement_p2.pdf [hereinafter Judgment 
Part II]. 
4.  Judgment Part II, supra note 3, ¶ 2360. 
360
PRUITT FINAL (DO NOT DELETE OR ADD TEXT HERE) 1/29/2018 10:17 AM       
 




     
 












[VOL. 15:  359, 2014] Destroying the Legacy of the ICTY 
SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J.
leader Josip Borz Tito died in 1980, and the region experienced the 
collapse of communist systems and the resurgence of nationalism in the 
decade that followed.5 Political and social crises in the Socialist Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia ultimately led to a violent break up of Yugoslavia 
in 1991 and to atrocities in the region.6 
SOCIALIST FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA

 AS OF JANUARI 19917

 5. About the ICTY: Establishment, INT’L CRIM. TRIB. FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA,
http://www.icty.org/sid/319 (last visited Jan. 8, 2014); Bosnian Genocide, HISTORY, 
http://www.history.com/topics/bosnian-genocide (last visited Jan. 8, 2014). 
6. Bosnian Genocide, supra note 5; see also About the ICTY: What is the Former 
Yugoslavia?, INT’L CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, http://www.icty. 
org/sid/321 (last visited Jan. 8, 2014) (The Socialist Federalist Republic of Yugoslavia 
(Socialističa Federativna Republika Jugoslavija, or SFRJ) was composed of six republics 
(Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, and Slovenia) and two 
autonomous provinces (Kosovo and Vojvodina). It ceased to exist in 1991. In 1992, 
Serbia and Montenegro founded the Federalist Republic of Yugoslavia (Savezna Republika 
Jugoslavija, SRJ). In 2003, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was reconstituted and re­
named as a State Union of Serbia and Montenegro (Državna Zajednica Srbiji i Crne
Gore, SCG), which lasted until Montenegro declared independence in 2006). 
7. About the ICTY: What is the Former Yugoslavia, supra note 6.
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One fervent promoter of nationalistic policies was Serb leader Slobodan 
Milosovic. Milosovic rose to power in Serbia in the mid-1980s.8 He 
emerged as a political force as president of the Serbian Community Party,9 
and won a democratic election to become president of Serbia in 1990.10 
As a leader with strong nationalist beliefs, Milosovic furthered the
discontent between Serbians in Bosnia and Croatia and their non-Serb
neighbors in Croatia, Bosnia, and Albania.11 In 1991, Slovenia, Croatia,
and Macedonia declared their independence from Yugoslavia.12 During
the subsequent war in Croatia, the Serb-dominated Yugoslav army
supported Serbian separatists in their clashes with Croatian forces.13 
Soon after Milosovic gained power, animosity built within Serbia and 
neighboring Bosnia.  In Bosnia, Muslims had been the majority population 
since 1971, but political tensions ran high as more Serbs and Croats
immigrated to the area.14 A 1990 election brought a Muslim president,
Bosniak Alija Izetbegović, into office.15 After the election, the Bosnian­
Serb-dominated Serbian Democratic Party withdrew from the government 
and established the “Serbia National Assembly.”16 On March 3, 1992, 
President Izetbegović officially declared Bosnia’s independence.17 
This declaration of independence was opposed by Bosnian-Serbs, led 
by Serbian Democratic Party leader Radovan Karadžić18 and General 
8. Timeline: The Milosovic Years, CNN.COM, Aug. 31, 2004, http://edition.cnn.
com/2004/WORLD/europe/08/31/milosevic.timeline/. 
9. Celestine Bohlen, Ex-Communist Chief Takes The Lead in Serbia’s Election, 
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10, 1990, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1990/12/10/world/ex­
communist-chief-takes-the-lead-in-serbia-s-election.html?ref=slobodanmilosevic. 
10. This was Serbia’s first democratically held election since 1938, before World
War II. See Celestine Bohlen, Ruling Party Wins Serbian Elections, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11,
1990, http://www.nytimes.com/1990/12/11/world/ruling-party-wins-serbian-elections.html?ref=slo 
bodan milosevic; see also Timeline: The Milosovic Years, supra note 8.
 11. Bosnian Genocide, supra note 5.






18. Press Release, ICTY Chambers, Tribunal dismisses Karadžić motion for 
acquittal on ten of one hundred counts of the indictment (June 28, 2012), http://www. 
icty.org/sid/10994; see also Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia, Case Information 
Sheet: Randovan Karadžić, http://icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/cis/en/cis_karadzic_en.pdf.  Karadžić
was a founding member of the Serbian Democratic Party (SDS) and the President of the 
SDS until his resignation on July 19, 1996.  Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia, 
supra, at 2. He was initially indicted on July 25, 1995, arrested on July 21, 2008, and
was charged on the basis of individual and superior criminal responsibility with 11
counts of genocide, crimes against humanity, and violations of the laws or customs of 
war. Id. at 2–4. The Trial Chamber initially granted Karadžić’s motion for acquittal of 
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Ratko Mladić,19 who wished to be part of a dominant Serbian state in the
Balkans. After President Izetbegović claimed Bosnia’s independence, 
Bosnian-Serb forces, backed by the Serbian-dominated Yugoslav army, 
bombarded Bosnia’s capital, Sarajevo.20 The Bosnian-Serb faction attacked
Bosnian towns and both forcibly expelled and participated in ethnic 
cleansing Bosnian Muslim civilians.21 Many Bosnians Muslims were driven
into concentration camps, where women and girls were gang raped and
other civilians were tortured, starved, and murdered.22 
In 1993, the U.N. Security Council declared Sarajevo, Goradze, 
Srebrenica, and other Muslim enclaves in Bosnia safe areas, protected
by U.N. peacekeepers.23 Despite the peacekeeping effort, Bosnian-Serbs
retained control of the area. By the end of 1993, Bosnian-Serbs controlled 
nearly three-quarters of the country and had displaced or killed most of
the Bosnian Muslims who were present at the beginning of the conflict in
1991 when Slovenia, Croatia, and Macedonia declared their independence
from Yugoslavia.24 Several peace proposals between a Croatian-Bosniak
federation and Bosnian Serbs failed because the Serbs refused to give up 
any territory. The United Nations refused to intervene in Bosnia, though 
a humanitarian effort spearheaded by the U.N. Commissioner for Refugees
provided aid to the conflict’s displaced, malnourished, and injured victims.25 
one count of genocide, but on July 11, 2013, the Appeals Chamber reversed the acquittal. 
Id. at 5. He currently awaits his trial. See id.
19. Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia, Case Information Sheet: Ratko 
Mladić http://www.icty.org/x/cases/mladic/cis/en/cis_mladic_en.pdf (Mladić was appointed
Commander of the Main Staff of the Bosnian Serb Army (VRS) on May 12, 1992 and 
promoted to Colonel General in June 1992. He was initially indicted on July 25, 1995 on
the same counts as Karadžić (genocide, crimes against humanity, and violations of the 
laws or customs of war). His trial commenced May 16, 2012). 
20. Bosnian Genocide, supra note 5.
 21. Id. “‘[T]here are obvious similarities between a genocidal policy and the 
policy commonly known as ‘ethnic cleansing’. . . yet ‘[a] clear distinction must be drawn 
between physical destruction and mere dissolution of a group.  The expulsion of a group 
or part of a group does not in itself suffice for genocide.’” Case Concerning Application
of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & 
Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro), 2007 I.C.J. 43, 123 (Feb. 26) (citing Prosecutor v. Krstić, 
Case No. IT-98-33-T, Judgement, ¶ 562 (Int’l Crim. Trib. For the Former Yugoslavia 
Aug. 2, 2001)).
22. Genocide in Bosnia (1992–1995), HOLOCAUST MUSEUM HOUSTON, http://www.hmh.
org/la_Genocide_Bosnia.shtml (last visited Jan. 8, 2014). 
23. Id. 
24. Bosnian Genocide, supra note 5.
 25. Id. 
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The international community was soon forced to develop a more effective
response.26 In 1994, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to stop
the attacks.27 
In July 1995, the Bosnian town of Srebrenica became the scene of the
worst massacre in the Bosnian war.28 Bosnian Serb forces began shelling 
Srebrenica, and Bosnian Muslim fighters, who had surrendered their
weapons to the U.N. peacekeepers, were defenseless.29 Days later, buses 
arrived to transport over 20,000 women and children to Bosnian territory,
while over 7,000 Muslim men were killed.30 
A month later, in August 1995, NATO joined Bosnian and Croatian 
forces for both a three week bombing campaign and for a ground offensive 
against Bosnian Serbs.31 The United Nations also implemented trade 
sanctions,32 which crippled the Serbian economy and depleted their military
forces. After three years of warfare, Milosovic finally agreed to enter 
into negotiations.33 Both Izetbegović and the Croatian president, Franjo
Tudjman, participated in these U.S.-sponsored peace talks in Dayton, 
Ohio, in November 1995.34 The Dayton Accords facilitated the creation of
a federalized Bosnia comprised of a Croat-Bosniak federation and a 
Serbian republic.35 
Before the Dayton Accords, the United Nations sought to address the
responsibility of those for the atrocities committed, which resulted in the 
U.N. Security Council’s creation of the ICTY in The Hague, Netherlands.36 
The ICTY was the first international tribunal created since the post-
World War II Nuremberg Trials ended in 1948, and the first ever to
specifically prosecute the crime of genocide, together with charges
involving war crimes, and crimes against humanity.
 26. Id. (The U.N. declared the towns of Srebrenica, Zepa, and Gorazde “safe
havens” in 1993, to be disarmed and protected by international peacekeeping forces. In 
July 1995, Bosnian Serb forces advanced on Srebrenica where the women were sent to
Bosnian-held territory and the men were killed or bussed to mass killing sites. Later that 
month, Bosnian Serb forces captured Zepa and exploded a bomb in a Sarajevo market.). 
27. Id. 
28. Timeline: Siege of Srebrenica, BBC NEWS, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/675945. 
stm (last updated June 9, 2005). 
29. Id. 
30. Id.; see also Genocide in Bosnia (1992–1995), supra note 22. 
31. Bosnian Genocide, supra note 5.




36. S.C. Res. 827, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993); see also Fausto Pocar, 
Introductory Note, Statutory of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia, AUDIOVISUAL LIBRARY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW. 
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III. FORMATION OF THE ICTY: CREATING THE FIRST AD HOC 

TRIBUNAL SINCE THE NUREMBURG TRIALS
 
Prosecution of international crimes and international war crimes in
domestic courts raise significant difficulties. However, in an effort to 
reconcile the need for justice for victims with the difficulties of domestic
prosecution, international criminal tribunals have been created to prosecute 
individuals directly for international war crimes.37 These ad hoc tribunals
are formed to address a particular international conflict.38 The first such 
tribunal, the Nuremberg Trials, was established by the Four Powers (U.S.,
Great Britain, France and Russia) following World War II, and remains
the most significant of these ad hoc tribunals today.39 After the close of 
the Nuremburg Trials, no use of an international tribunal to prosecute a
major war criminal was attempted until 1993, when the ICTY took action.40 
The U.N. Security Council has taken a limited approach and has only 
established two ad hoc tribunals: the ICTY and the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) in 1994.41 
The United Nations gave the ICTY the authority to prosecute persons
responsible for specific crimes committed in the territory of what is 
referred to as “the former Yugoslavia” since January 1991.42 It is a U.N. 
court of law prosecuting war crimes that took place in the Balkans in the 
1990s and43 represents several major steps in the enforcement of 
international criminal law.44 The ICTY Statute requires the Tribunal to 
37. STEVEN R. RATNER, ET AL., ACCOUNTABILITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW: BEYOND THE NUREMBERG LEGACY 209 (3d ed. 2009). 
38. Id. 
39. Id. at 210 (explaining that the Governments of the Allies tried and punished
major war criminals at the Nuremburg Tribunal, which had jurisdiction “over individuals
who, as individuals or as members of organizations, committed crimes against peace,
war crimes, or crimes against humanity.”).
40. Id. at 212. 
41. See generally THE SECURITY COUNCIL, http://www.un.org/en/sc/ (last visited 
Dec. 20, 2014). A few other special tribunals are currently operating; however, these
tribunals have had very mixed results. See, e.g., Special Tribunal for Lebanon, UN.ORG,
http://www.un.org/apps/news/infocus/lebanon/tribunal/ (last visited Feb. 12, 2014) (stating
that the Special Tribunal for Lebanon was established on June 10, 2007 to prosecute 
persons responsible for the death of former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri and other
persons).
42. See About the ICTY: What is the former Yugoslavia?, supra note 6. 
43. About the ICTY: Establishment, supra note 5.
 44. RATNER, supra note 37, at 211. 
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investigate and prosecute offenses of war crimes, crimes against humanity,45 
and genocide.46 
The principal goal of U.N. Security Council Resolution 827, which
established the Tribunal, is “to put an end to such crimes and to take 
effective measures to bring to justice the persons who are responsible for 
them” and to “contribute to the restoration and maintenance of peace.”47 
Resolution 827 proposes a standard to restore and maintain peace and
security while effectively redressing crimes.48 Since its establishment, 
the ICTY has indicted 161 people for violations of humanitarian law, and 
has sentenced sixty-nine individuals to date.49 
The ICTY aims to establish precedent for indicting war criminals by 
locating and charging individuals associated with the crimes committed
in the Balkans. On its website, the ICTY claims to have “irreversibly 
changed the landscape of international criminal and humanitarian law.”50 
But while the Tribunal began with an impressive list of indictments and 
some early convictions, recent acquittals of key perpetrators of war crimes 
bring the future of the ICTY into question. 51 The decision in the case
discussed herein is representative of the current threat to the legacy of the 
ICTY and the future of international tribunals that aim to bring justice to
victims of similar atrocities.
IV. THE CASE AGAINST JOVICA STANIŠIĆ AND FRANKO SIMATOVIĆ
Jovica Stanišić and Franko Simatović were the former Chief of the 
Serbian State Security Service (“DB”)52 and former employee of the
45. S.C. Res. 827, supra note 36, paras. 5–6. 
46. Id. para. 7 (“Believing that the establishment of an international tribunal and 
the prosecution of persons responsible for the above-mentioned violations of international 
humanitarian law will contribute to ensuring that such violations are halted and effectively 
redressed.”).
47. Id., paras. 5–6.
48. Id. para. 7.
49. About the ICTY: Infographic: ICTY Facts & Figures, ICTY, http://www.icty.org/ 
sid/11186 (last visited Jan. 8, 2014) (Eighteen individuals have been acquitted, 13 have 
been transferred to countries in the former Yugoslavia for trial, and 46 proceedings were
terminated or had the indictments withdrawn.).
50. Id. 
51. See id. 
52. The abbreviation DB comes from the Serbian name of the State Security
Service, Državne Bezbednosti, see Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Simatović, Case No. IT-03­
69, Judgment Part I, ¶ 5 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia May 30, 2013),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/stanisic_simatovic/tjug/en/130530_judgement_p1.pdf 
[hereinafter Judgment Part I]. 
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Serbian State Security Service, respectively.53 Stanišić and Simatović
had directed, equipped, trained, and financed the DB, which consisted of 
twenty-five to thirty people.54 According to an anonymous witness at 
trial, the DB was tasked with “protecting the legal and social order, doing
intelligence work, and dealing with political crimes, terrorism, and
extremism.”55 According to the Rules of the Internal Organisation of the 
DB of January 1992, “the Chief of the DB was responsible for, inter alia, 
organizing the performance of DB tasks, directing and coordinating the 
work of all organizational units, deciding how to employ assets and
methods, and providing recommendations for staffing.”56 
The ICTY charged Stanišić and Simatović with directing, organizing, 
equipping, training, arming, and financing units of the Serbian State 
Security Service, which murdered, deported, and persecuted non-Serb 
civilians from Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia in the 1990s.57 They
were allegedly involved in a joint criminal enterprise whose objective
was the forcible and permanent removal of the majority of non-Serbs58 
from large areas of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina.59 The prosecution 
claimed Stanišić and Simatović commissioned crimes against humanity 
and “shared the intent to further the common criminal purpose.”60 Stanišić
and Simatović were each charged with “individual criminal responsibility
under Article 7(1)61 of the Statute for committing crimes as part of a joint
criminal enterprise” and “having planned, ordered, and/or otherwise aided
and abetted in the planning, preparation, and/or execution of the crimes 
described in the Indictment.”62 
53. Press Release, Chambers, Jovica Stanišić and Franko Simatović Acquitted of
All Charges, U.N. Press Release MS/CS/PR1567e (May 30, 2013), available at http:// 
www.icty.org/sid/11329 [hereinafter Stanišić and Simatović Acquitted]. 
54. Id. 
55.  Judgment Part II, supra note 3, ¶ 1273. 
56. Id. 
57. Marlise Simons, U.N. Court Acquits 2 Serbs of War Crimes, N.Y. TIMES, May 
30, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/31/world/europe/un-court-acquits-2-serbs­
of-crimes-in-balkan-wars.html?_r=1&. 
58. I.e., Croats, Bosnian Muslims, and Bosnian Croats. 
59.  Judgment Part I, supra note 52, ¶ 5. 
60. Id. 
61. “A person who planned, instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise aided and
abetted in the planning, preparation or execution of a crime referred to in articles 2 to 5 
of the present Statute, shall be individually responsible for the crime.” 
62.  Judgment Part I, supra note 52, ¶ 51. 
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An initial indictment against Stanišić and Simatović was filed on May
1, 2003, and Serbian authorities arrested both on May 13, 2003.63 A few 
months later, both were transferred to the custody of the ICTY and at
their initial appearances each pled not guilty to all charges at their initial 
appearances.64 
V. THE TRIAL OF STANIŠIĆ AND SIMATOVIĆ
The lengthy trial of Stanišić and Simatović lasted multiple years, in 
part because of Stanišić’s poor health, which repeatedly postponed the 
trial until June 9, 2009, and in part because of the magnitude of the 
evidence proffered by both parties.65 During the trial, ninety-five expert 
witnesses and over one hundred lay witnesses to the crimes appeared before
the Chamber.66 In total, almost 5,000 exhibits were admitted into 
evidence.67 The prosecution rested on April 5, 2011 and the defense’s
presentation lasted from June 15, 2011 to September 17, 2012.68 Closing 
arguments were held from January 29–30, 2013, and the three-judge 
panel released their decision acquitting Stanišić and Simatović on May
30, 2013.69 Ultimately, the tribunal concluded that an actual conflict and
war crimes occurred, yet acquitted both Stanišić and Simatović.70 
As a threshold matter, the Chamber concluded that an armed conflict 
existed in the territories of Croatia, Bosnia, and Herzegovina and that the 
victims of the crimes committed in the indictment area were predominately 
non-Serb civilians.71 Then the Chamber received evidence regarding 
multiple incidents overseen by Stanišić and Simatović as well as crimes
committed by the secret police in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina under
their direction72 Specifically, the Chamber found that the secret police 
committed the crimes of deportation and forcible transfer in Croatia and 
Bosnia-Herzegovina.73 
The Chamber found that Stanišić and Simatović “directed the [DB] Unit 
in particular operations in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina; organized, 
supplied, financed, and supported the involvement of the Unit in particular 
63. Stanišić and Simatović Acquitted, supra note 53. 
64. Id. 
65. Id. 
66. See generally Judgment Part I, supra note 52, ¶¶ 8, 16. 




71.  Judgment Summary, supra note 3. 
72. See id.
 73. Id. 
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operations; and directed and organized the financing, training, logistical 
support, and other substantial assistance or support for the Unit.”74 
During Stanišić’s and Simatović’s trial, the Chamber also considered
specific incidents of detention and forcible transfer by the secret police.
The Chamber heard eyewitness testimony for a specific incident that 
occurred on April 9, 1992.75 The witnesses stated that members of the SDG,
an entity subordinate to the DB that Stanišić and Simatović also controlled,76 
and other armed men gathered at least ninety Croats and Hungarians 
from Erdut and put them on buses to Sarvaš.77 Once they were in Sarvaš, 
according to the witnesses, the SDG told some of the Croats and
Hungarians to walk toward Croat-controlled Osijek, while others were 
bused to other locations.78 Thus, the Chamber found beyond a reasonable
doubt that these SDG committed the crime of deportation as a crime
against humanity.79 In addition to the incident on April 9, 1992, the
Chamber also found the SDG committed numerous other incidents 
of deportation and forcible transfer at numerous locations in Croatia and
Bosnia-Herzegovina in the 1990s.80 Further, the Chamber concluded
that the secret police and other Serbian forces committed mass murders
against non-Serbs, including Croats and Muslims in Croatia and Bosnia­
Herzegovina.81 The Chamber found these crimes had been executed with 
discriminatory intent, and thus qualified as crimes against humanity.82 
After determining the existence of these crimes, the Chamber determined 
whether it could attribute these crimes to Stanišić and Simatović. The 
Chamber found “the Accused directed and organized its formation; 
organized its involvement in a number of operations in Croatia and
Bosnia-Herzegovina; and directed and organized its financing, logistical 
support, and other substantial assistance or support, throughout the 
Indictment period.”83 Further, the Chamber found that Stanišić and 
Simatović directed, organized, and funded the formation of the DB, and 
74.  Judgment Part II, supra note 3, ¶ 1287. 
75.  Judgment Part I, supra note 52, ¶ 511. 
76. “Srpska Dobrovoljačka Garda,” is Serbian for “Serbian Volunteer Guard,” an
entity which is subordinate to DB. 
77.  Judgment Part I, supra note 52, ¶¶ 1025–1030. 
78. Id. 
79.  Judgment Part I, supra note 52, ¶ 1030. 
80.  Judgment Summary, supra note 3. 
81. Id. 
82.  Judgment Part I, supra note 52, ¶ 1245. 
83. Id. ¶ 2318. 
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supported it with weapons and communications equipment.84 Yet, 
despite the Chamber’s finding of Stanišić and Simatović’s facilitation of
and complicity in the crimes, the majority did not find that the accused
provided “channels of communication” between the core members of the 
joint criminal enterprise.85 Oddly, the Chamber justified its decision with 
citations to evidence that seemingly proved that the accused did, indeed, 
provide channels of communication.86 
Lastly, the Chamber considered whether Stanišić and Simatović had
the intent to forcibly remove the majority of Serbs from large areas through 
murder, forcible transfer, and persecution.87 Despite reviewing direct 
evidence demonstrating the defendants’ intent,88 the majority found that
Stanišić and Simatović did not possess the requisite intent.89 The majority
decided that it could not reasonably infer that Stanišić and Simatović
shared the intent to further the alleged joint criminal enterprise.90 
The Chamber’s decision specifically states that they consider “Stanišić’s
reference to killings and his remark that ‘we’ll exterminate them 
completely’ to be too vague to support for the allegation that Stanišić shared
the intent to further the alleged common criminal purpose.”91 Even though
the Chamber considered evidence and testimony that implicated Stanišić
and Simatović in the crimes executed during the Bosnian conflict in the 
1990s, the majority declined to convict two of its main perpetrators. 
VI. CONTRASTING STANIŠIĆ AND SIMATOVIĆACQUITTAL WITH THE 
CONVICTIONS OF DUŠKO TADIĆ AND ANTO FURUNDŽIJA
Prior to Stanišić’s and Simatović’s case, the ICTY convicted other war
criminals on similar, if not less, evidence. Duško Tadić was the first
person tried by the ICTY and his trial was the first international war 
crimes trial to involve charges of sexual violence.92 Tadić was President 
of the Local Board of the Serb Democratic Party in the Bosnian town of
Kozarac,93 and was involved in the killing and deportation of non-Serb 
citizens there. On May 24, 1992, Bosnian-Serb forces in Kozarac began an
 84. Id. ¶ 2108. 
85. Id. ¶ 2304. 
86. See id. ¶¶ 2290–2304. 
87. Id. ¶¶ 2305–06. 
88. See id. ¶¶ 2305–10. 
89. See id. ¶¶ 2305–10. 
90. Id. 
91. Id. ¶ 2309. 
92. Landmark Cases, INT’L CRIM. TRIB. FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, http://itcy.org/
sid/10314 (last visited Jan. 8, 2014); see also Tadić, Duško, THE HAGUE JUSTICE PORTAL,
http://www.haguejusticeportal.net/index.php?id=6077. (last visited Jan. 8, 2014). 
93. Tadić, Duško, supra note 92; see also Landmark Cases, supra note 92. 
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artillery barrage that killed 800 citizens.94 After they captured the town, 
Bosnian-Serb forces, aided by Tadić, forcibly removed the entire
non-Serb population from the area.95 After indictment, trial, and appeal, 
Tadić was ultimately convicted of willful killing, torture or inhuman 
treatment, and murder.96 
In its analysis of both the prosecution and defense arguments, the 
Chamber stated “the crimes consisted of killings, beatings, and forced
transfer by Duško Tadić as principal or as an accessory, as well as his
participation in the attack on the town of Kozarac in Opstina Prijedor.”97 
The Chamber found that, “the beating was severe and contained the 
common factors of humiliation, ethnic persecution and physical violence.”98 
Lastly, the Chamber stated that “Duško Tadić was aware that his acts were 
part of, and contributed to, the crime against humanity committed by 
Bosnian Serb forces against the non-Serb population of Opstina Prijedor.”99 
In the Tadić appeals judgment, the Appeals Chamber announced the 
“specific direction” standard.  A different panel of judges in the appeals 
hearing explained this standard, stating, that “[t]he aider and abettor carries 
out acts specifically directed to assist, encourage or lend moral support
to the perpetration of a certain specific crime (murder, extermination, rape, 
torture, wanton destruction of civilian property, etc.), and this support 
has a substantial effect upon the perpetration of the crime.”100 The Chamber 
applied the specific direction standard to Tadić and found him guilty of
aiding and abetting. Yet, in the trial of Stanišić and Simaotić, the Chamber
refused to employ this same approach despite this established precedent. 
Another leader who was convicted for crimes by his subordinates was 
Anto Furundžija. Anto Furundžija was the local commander of the “Jokers,” 
a unit of the Croatian Defence Council (HVO), in central Bosnia and
 94. Tadić, Duško, supra note 92. 
95. Id. 
96. Press Release, Trial Chambers, Duško Tadić Sentenced to 20 Years’
Imprisonment, U.N. Press Release CC/PIO/226-E (July 14, 1997) available at http://www.
icty.org/x/cases/tadic/tjug/en/970714_Tadic_summary_en.pdf. 
97. Id. at 1. 
98. Id. at 5. 
99. Id. at 7. 
100. Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1, Judgment, ¶ 229 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for
the Former Yugoslavia July 15, 1999), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/tadic/acjug/en/tad­
aj990715e.pdf. 
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Herzegovina.101 The ICTY convicted Furundžija of violations of the laws of
customs of war for torture and outrages upon personal dignity, including
rape, even though he did not personally rape anyone.102 According to the
prosecution, during Furundžija’s interrogations he would allow subordinate
soldiers to threaten, rape, and beat Muslim women.103 Furundžija did 
nothing to stop or curtail these actions, and instead continued to interrogate
the woman, which, according to the Chamber substantially contributed 
to the criminal acts inflicted upon the victims.104 The Chamber found him to
have aided and abetted these outrages upon personal dignity and sentenced
him to ten years imprisonment.105 
These initial convictions stand in sharp contrast to the Chamber’s recent 
acquittals of Stanišić and Simatović. In all three trials, the prosecution 
presented comparable evidence tying the crimes to the perpetrators, yet 
the Chamber reached a significantly different result in the Stanišić and
Simatović case. 
VII. EARLY RESULTS OF THE ICTY: ESTABLISHING A LEGACY BASED 
ON EARLY CONVICTIONS OF WAR CRIMINALS
Initially, the ICTY built a credible legacy106 by indicting several low-
level defendants early in its tenure.107 As of fall 2008, the ICTY had
indicted approximately 160 people and concluded proceedings against 
113, resulting in fifty-five convictions, nine acquittals, and thirteen
defendants referred to national courts.108 Early on, there was debate over 
whether too many “little fish”109 had been indicted.110 As one former
ICTY judge responded, no “big fish” had been apprehended and “it was 
necessary to show the world that the newly created Tribunal was not a
mere paper shell, but a functioning court, ready to try any war criminal it 
could legitimately get its hands on.”111 However, when the ICTY was
101. Int’l Crim. Trib. For the Former Yugoslavia, Case Information Sheet: Anto
Furundžija, http://icty.org/x/cases/furundzija/cis/en/cis_furundzija.pdf. 
102. Id. at 1, 3–4. 
103. Id. at 1. 
104. Id. 
105. Id. at 4. 
106. RATNER, supra note 37, at 220; Wald, Patricia, ICTY Judicial Proceedings: An
Appraisal from Within, 2 J. INT’L CRIM. L. 466  (2004). 
107. Wald, supra note 106, at 468–69. 
108. RATNER, supra note 37, at 220 (explaining that the remaining individuals either
had their indictments withdrawn by the prosecutor or died during proceedings). 
109. “I.e., middle and lower level functionaries in larger operations, designed to 
perpetrate war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide, which were instigated and 
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able to access more serious perpetrators, the courts were consumed with 
smaller trials, which often took up to a year to complete.112 
Though the trials were extremely time consuming, the United Nations
established the ICTY to try and convict war criminals that committed the 
atrocities in Yugoslavia. The ICTY’s goal was to set precedential decisions 
regarding genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity, and to
attempt to prove that “[g]uilt should be individualized” and that “an
individual’s senior position can no longer protect them from prosecution.”113 
The initial indictment of Milosovic brought excitement and the appearance
of justice to the international stage, and early convictions of leaders
indicated major success for the tribunal. These early successes, however, 
are being tainted by recent acquittals. 
VIII. LASTING LEGACY OF THE ICTY: THREATS TO THE EARLY 

SUCCESS OF THE ICTY 

Decisions like the one in the Stanišić and Simatović case threaten the 
legacy and permanent record of the ICTY. The Chamber’s decision
fluctuates between two polar opposites: it affirms the commission of crimes
against humanity and describes them with excruciatingly detailed witness 
accounts, but it refuses to convict the defendants of such crimes. In fact,
the decision even names the perpetrators, the victims, and connects
the accused (Stanišić and Simatović) to the perpetrators. Then, ultimately, 
the Chamber fails to convict Stanišić and Simatović because the support
they provided was not “specifically directed towards the commission of 
the crimes of murder, deportation, forcible transfer, or persecution,”114 
but rather was “directed toward establishing and maintaining Serb control 
over these areas.”115 The Chamber seems to adopt a new standard of
“specific direction,” which was previously used to acquit Ante Gotovina
and Mladen Markac, two Croatian generals accused of using military
force to compel Serbian civilians to flee Croatia.116 Just as the ICTY seemed 
112. Id. at 468-69. 
113. About the ICTY, INT’L CRIM. TRIB. FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, http://www.icty. 
org/sections/AbouttheICTY (last visited Jan. 8, 2014). 
114.  Judgment Part II, supra note 3, ¶ 2360. 
115. Id. 
116. Id. ¶ 1264 (“Proof of specific direction in such circumstances requires 
evidence establishing a direct link between the aid provided by an accused and the 
relevant crimes committed by principal perpetrators. Specific direction may involve 
considerations that are closely related to questions of mens rea and evidence regarding
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close to setting a groundbreaking precedent, it almost immediately backed
off. 
The ICTY has had access to more prominent suspects and an opportunity 
to set a precedent of prosecution of large-scale war crimes. The Chamber
had succeeded in convicting heads of state, senior generals, and other
perpetrators. These prior cases may set precedents for future trials for 
genocide and other crimes against humanity. However, the recent acquittals
rejecting the earlier standards of a leader’s culpability threaten the legacy
and impact of the ICTY. The implication set by these cases may affect
conflict-ridden governments like Syria and Afghanistan in the future. 
Further, despite the ICTY’s achievements, the creation of similar ad
hoc tribunals is unlikely.117 There is hesitation among international
actors to establish another large and expensive U.N. bureaucracy funded
by mandatory contributions of U.N. members.118 Some states are wary of 
the U.N. Security Council creating tribunals for political reasons rather 
than principle.119 Much of the hesitation stems from the flaws in these
tribunals that have been highlighted in the ICTY’s execution. The
proceedings are extremely lengthy, lasting several years, and, as one scholar 
suggested, may “possibly violat[e] the defendant’s right to a speedy trial 
and the victims’ right to see justice done quickly.”120 The tribunals have
only a minor effect on reconciliation and national justice, and have had 
little deterrent effect.121 Moreover, as demonstrated by the ICTY, these 
tribunals are only able to try a small percentage of offenders, with erratic 
sentencing practices that result in sentences that are far too lenient given 
the seriousness of the offenses.122 
an individual’s state of mind may serve as circumstantial evidence that assistance he or
she facilitated was specifically directed towards charged crimes. The aider and abettor
must have knowledge that his or her acts or omissions assist in the commission of the 
crime of the principal perpetrator. The aider and abettor must also be aware of the 
principal perpetrator’s criminal acts, although not their legal characterization, and his or
her criminal state of mind. This includes the specific intent of the principal perpetrator, if
the crime requires such intent. The aider and abettor does not, however, need to know 
either the precise crime that was intended or the one that was actually committed; it is 
sufficient that he or she be aware that one of a number of crimes will probably be committed,
if one of those crimes is in fact committed.”).
117. RATNER, supra note 37, at 252. 
118. Id.; Ralph Zacklin, The Failings of Ad Hoc International Tribunals, 2 J. INT’L.
CRIM. JUST. 541, 543–44 (2004) (arguing that tribunals’ results may not justify their
consumption of 10 percent of annual UN budget).
119. 
120. 
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IX. CONCLUSION
Professor Jenia Iontcheva Turner wrote “[a] perception exists, perhaps 
fueled by the politicized nature of the recent high-profile trials of
Saddam Hussein and Slobodan Milosevic, that international criminal 
trials are essentially political events cloaked as judicial proceedings.”123 
The ICTY has the opportunity to prove that international criminal trials 
can be more than political events and thus the ability to impact the future
of international criminal law. 
The formation of and initial indictments by the ICTY provided early
hope of prosecuting those responsible for atrocities that occurred only a 
decade earlier. While the ICTY was founded in hopes of healing victims 
and bringing peace to the region, recent decisions—in particular the
acquittal of Stanišić and Simatović—threaten the future of the ICTY and 
raise concerns about the effectiveness of criminal tribunals throughout
the world. As former Chief Prosecutor of the ICTY Carla del Ponte has
said, 
The ICTY has confirmed that it tends to abolish the concept of command
responsibility in international criminal law as well as the concept of complicity of
military and civilian leaders in systemic violence. This has rewarded the
masterminds of the system who managed, through deception, to plan and organise 
violence on a mass scale . . ., making sure that they did not write a direct order.124 
The Stanišić and Simatović judgment leaves the international law of
facilitation in a state of disarray. The ICTY’s decision could have
repercussions across the global stage and in future trials of war criminals.
In order to retain the legacy of the ICTY and significantly impact future 
ad hoc tribunals and criminal trials, the ICTY must repudiate aspects of 
the Stanišić and Simatović judgment on appeal or correct its reasoning in 
future cases regarding complicity. With the upcoming trials of the
leaders Radovan Karadžić and Ratko Mladić, the ICTY must return to 
the principle that an individual’s senior position can no longer protect 
them from prosecution it so clearly accepted in earlier cases. 
123.  Jenia Iontcheva Turner, Defense Perspectives on Law and Politics in International
Criminal Trials, 48 VA. J. INT’L L. 529, 531 (2008). 
124. Acquittal of Stanišić and Simatović yet another blow to ICTY’s credibility, 
DALJE.COM (June 1, 2013, 6:22 PM), http://dalje.com/en-world/acquittal-of-stanisic-and­
simatovic-yet-another-blow-to-ictys-credibility/470412. 
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